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THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT LIMITATIONS ON
A FORUM STATE USING ITS PUBLIC POLICY TO
NEGATE PARTIES' AUTONOMY IN THE VALIDITY
OF CONFLICT-OF-LAWS CONTRACTS
PART TWO-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Louis C. JAMES*

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CASES

I

of the application of full
faith and credit to statutes; I believe that many will agree with
me that if there is jurisdiction in the forum, full faith and credit
will usually be given to judgments of sister states. 39
SHALL SPEAK MAINLY IN THIS SECTION

In Alaska PackersAss'n v. IndustrialAcc. Comm'n of Calif.,40
an alien, non-resident worker in California made a contract of employment there with appellant, an association doing business in
California, whereby he would be transported as a seasonal worker
to Alaska and returned to California when the work was completed. The agreement stipulated that in the event of an injury to
the worker in the course of his employment, Alaska law, where
he was to work, would apply. The worker was injured in the course
0 Professor of Law, the American University, Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C.
Part I of this article appeared in 41 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1 (Spring 1964).
139 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 546
(1935), in which the Court lists those types of cases in which a state court is not required
to give full faith and credit to state judgments. See also, Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1951-52). Also, see Leflar,
Conflict of Laws §§ 71, 74, 133-137, 141-143 (Student ed. 1959); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
611-614 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 71-110, 111-133 (2d ed.
1951); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 206-234 (1962).
140 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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of his employment in Alaska. Upon his return to California, he
sued the appellant association under that state's workmen's compensation law. Two constitutional issues developed: (1) Would the
due process of law clause of the Federal Constitution prevent California from assuming jurisdiction? and (2) Would California have
to give full faith and credit to the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Statute?
The Court answered both questions quite definitely. California's interest in and contacts with the agreement, in an issue
characterized as contract rather than tort, were of such weight that
it did not have to fear any jurisdictional due process of law constitutional restrictions and did not have to give full faith and credit
to the Alaska public policy. California was therefore permitted to
use its own law (public policy) in the decision.
Mr. Justice Stone (later Chief Justice) delivered the Court's
opinion. Said the Court:
Section 58 of the California Workmen's Compensation Act
was then in force [when the contract of employment was made]

which provides: "The commission shall have jurisdiction over all
controversies arising out of injuries suffered without the territorial
limits of this State in those cases where the injured employee is a
resident of this State at the time of the injury and the contract of
"141
hire is made in this State ..

The California Workmen's Compensation Act further provided
that "No contract, rule or regulation shall exempt the employer
from liability for the compensation fixed by this act .. .
Continued the Court:
Insofar as the California statute denies validity to the agreement
that the parties should be bound by the Alaska Workmen's Com-

pensation Act, and attempts to give a remedy for injuries suffered

by a non-resident employee without this state, it is challenged as a

143
denial of due process.

Said the Court:
Petitioner [appellant association] also insists that as the Alaska
statute affords, in Alaska, an exclusive remedy for the injury which
occurred there, the California courts denied full faith and credit
141
142
143

Id. at 540-541.
Calif. Stat. 1917, § 58.
294 U.S. at 539.
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to the Alaska statute by refusing to recognize it as a defense
to the
144
application for an award under the California statute.
The Court first considered the due-process-of-law defense. Said the
Court:
The California statute does not purport to have any extraterritorial effect, in the sense that it undertakes to impose a rule for
foreign tribunals, nor did the judgment of this state court give it
any. The statute assumes only to provide a remedy to be granted
by the California Commission for injuries, received in the course
of employment entered into within the state, wherever they may
occur. [Observe contract made in California,which gave that state
a most significant contact with the agreement.]145

The Court then assumed that in Alaska the injured employee, if he had so chosen, could have asserted his rights to benefits
under the Alaska statute. In such a case, if any effect were then
given to the statute of California, it would .be only by comity or
possibly under the full faith and credit clause. The Court found

that California's vital interests in and important contacts with
essential elements of the transaction were such that it had dueprocess-of-law jurisdiction over the controversy. Also, the Court
readily characterized the issue as one in contract rather than in
tort. In so doing, the Court admitted that the results might have
been different had a tort characterization been made by stating
that:
While similar power to control the legal consequences of a tortious
act committed elsewhere has been denied, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S., 542, 547; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278; compare Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, the liability
under workmen's compensation acts is not for a tort. It is imposed
as an incident of the employment relationship, as a cost to be
borne by the business enterprise, rather than as an attempt to
extend redress for the wrongful act of the employer. See Bradford
Light Co. v. Clapper, supra., 157, 158 [286 U.S. 145
Electric
146
(1932)]
The Court looked at the peculiar factual situation presented
by this case. It found that,
The employee, an alien more than two thousand miles from his
home in Mexico, was, with fifty-three others, employed by petitioner in California. The contract called for their transportation
144

Ibid.

145
146

Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
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to Alaska, some three thousand miles distant, for seasonal employment of between two and three months, at the conclusion of which
they were to147be returned to California, and were there to receive
their wages.
The Court continued,
The meager facts disclosed by the record suggest a practice of employing workers in California for seasonal occupation in Alaska,
under such conditions as to make it improbable that the employees
injured in the course of their employment in Alaska would be
able to apply for compensation there. It was necessary for them
to return to California in order to receive their full wages. They
would be accompanied by their fellow workers, who would normally be the witnesses required to establish the fact of the injury
and its nature. The probability is slight that injured workmen,
once returned to California, would be able to retrace their steps
to Alaska, and there successfully [was the Court speaking in terms
of convenient or inconvenient forum?] procure their claim for compensation. Without a remedy in California, they would be remediess, and there was the danger that they might become public
charges [vital interests of California
demonstrated], both matters
148

of grave public concern to the state.

Therefore, thought the Court, California had a reasonable basis for
the use of its statute rather than that of Alaska. There was, in the
Court's view, a superior governmental interest in California instead of Alaska, such that its public policy instead of that of Alaska
should be used. Then the Court stated:
Even though the compensation acts of either jurisdiction may,
consistently with due process, be applied in either, the question
remains whether the California court has failed to accord full faith
and credit to the Alaska statute in refusing to149allow it as a defense
to the award of the California Commission.
If there is a conflict of two states in their public policies, then one
must give way'15 to the other depending upon vital interests and
contacts of the two states with essential elements of the contract.
Which public policy must give way is dependent upon which
state has a better balance of equities in its favor under the facts of
the particular situation. California had held in its state courts that
it did not have to give full faith and credit to the public policy of
Alaska.' 51 The Court said,
147 Id. at 542.

Ibid.
Id. at 544.
150 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 US. 609 (1951), Mr. Justice Black speaking for the Court.
151 294 U.S. at 545.

148
149
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To the extent that California is required to give full faith and
credit to the conflicting Alaska statute, it must be denied the right
to apply in its own courts a statute 152
of the state, lawfully enacted
in pursuance of its domestic policy.

Did full faith and credit under this factual pattern require the
California Courts to give more credit to an Alaskan statute than
to a California law? The Court then said:
It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some
limitations upon the extent to which a state will be required by
the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of
another state, in contravention of its own statutes or policy. [Note
the conjunction "or" in this last sentence.] See Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657;
Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335; see also Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S.
186; Hood v. Mchee, 237 U.S. 611; compare Gasquet v. Fenner,
247 U.S. 16.158
Then the Court examined the equity of always requiring a forum,
under all conditions, to give full faith and credit to the statutes of
other states in its courts when there is a conflict between statutes.
When statutes of two states conflict, there must be
. . . some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the two
states ....
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and
credit clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would
lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other,
but cannot be enforced in its own. Unless by force of that clause
a greater effect is thus to be given to a state statute abroad than
the clause permits it to have at home, it is unavoidable that this
Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one
state may qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of another. [The Court seems to be stating that in any factual situation
involving a clash of public policies of two states in Conflict-ofLaws matters, the Court must rationally make a decision from its
own subjective appraisement of the facts before it.] 154
The Court thought that in any multistate conflict of states'

public policies in regard to a contractual transaction
* * . rights claimed under one statute prevail only by denying
effect to the other. In both the conflict is to be resolved, not by
giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to
those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of
each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to
their weight. [Again, we observe the element of equity, fairness,
152

Ibid.

158 Id.
154 Id.

at 546.
at 547.
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reasonableness, and non-discrimination in the Court's remarks.
How else is the equation of Order versus Liberty to be balanced
except by these factors of a least common denominator of constitutional construction?]155

In its decision, the Court stated that,
The enactment of the present statute of California was within
state power and infringes no constitutional provision. Prima facie
every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,
lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the
force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the full
faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some
rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of
the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It follows that
not every statute of another state will override a conflicting statute
of the forum by virtue of the full faith and credit clause; that the
statute of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute of
another, both at home and abroad; and, again, that the two conflicting statutes may each prevail over the other at home, although
given no extraterritorial effect in the state of the other. 156

Let us pause for a moment and see what the Court has said.

First, it is quite obvious that for full faith and credit to be considered at all, there must be jurisdiction of the forum over the
controversy. Otherwise, there would be a taking of property without due process of law. 157 That this due process jurisdiction is
premised upon the vitality of the contacts and interests of a state
in a multistate contractual transaction is hardly open to doubt. 58
Second, after we are sure of jurisdictional standing of the forum,
we begin with a presumption that a lawful enactment of the public
policy of a forum having jurisdiction over the controversy is due
respect in the forum by forum courts; 159 that the burden of showing that the statute of another state is owed full faith and credit
because that state has superior contacts with and interests in an
essential element of the transaction rests upon the party who alleges it. Third, that if there is a balance between important contacts and interests of states with the transaction, then each state
has a right in its own courts to use its public policy in the litiga155 Ibid.
156 Id. at 547-548.

157 Cf., Homes Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also, International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
158 Ibid.

159 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 547-548
(1935).
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6
tion arising in its courts. 60 Fourth, that there has to be an arbiter' '
in cases involving states with conflicting policies when those states
each have contacts and interests in the transaction; that this arbiter
is the United States Supreme Court. Fifth, that the Court will rationally but subjectively appraise the respective factual situations
in each case as it arises, and, as best it can, weigh the contacts and
interests of each state with the transaction to determine which
state, if any, has the superior governmental interests in and contacts with an essential element of the transaction; the state having
this superiority will be permitted to use its policy determinants in
the case;' 62 if the other state refuses to give full faith and credit to
the superior state's statutes, then the Court will, as arbiter, see that
it does.' Sixth, that full faith and credit is not an automatic constitutional norm'64 with absolutes as standards but depends upon
equitable considerations of fairness and justice by the Court in
making its own determination of where the superior governmental
contacts and interests lie. Seventh, that when the contacts and
interests with essential elements of the transaction are evenly
balanced between the states involved, then the Court will leave
each state its power to apply in its courts its own policy determinants. 65 The equation of Order versus Liberty based upon factors
or elements of the least common denominator in arriving at the
decision will prevail in all cases as the Court rationally but subjectively sees the balancing of contacts and governmental interests
of the respective states concerned. 66 Behind the Court's decision,
therefore, in each case must be ranged the factors of fairness,
justice, equity, reasonableness, and non-discrimination. 6 7 Any
party litigant proceeding in one of these multistate factual situaIbid.
161 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). In a federal system, an arbiter is a
necessity by the very nature of the system of government when there is a conflict between
the parts of the system. The Supreme Court has, on the whole, assumed much of the
duties of an arbiter in such matters.
162 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 549-550
(1935).
163 See Hughes v. Fetter, supra note 161.
164 Cf., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954).
165 This is certainly implied in both Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n
of Calif., supra note 162, and Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., supra
note 164.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
160
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tions had as well recognize these intangibles16 at the start and direct his efforts in getting a decision by a showing of superior
equities in the policy he desires to be applied to the decision by the
Court. Eighth, it appears that characterization 169 may play a very
important part in many case decisions; as, for instance, it may be
quite vital whether the issue is characterized as tort or contract in
70
jurisdictional attainment and the exercise of full faith and credit.
It would appear that there are constitutional restrictions under due
process of law and even under full faith and credit as to how far a
state court may proceed to characterize the question arbitrarily
7
and unreasonably in order to attain the use of its public policy.' '
Ninth, it is uncertain how far the concept of a convenient or inconvenient forum may be a part of the bases of acquiring jurisdiction
in the first place; 172 possibly, this is even more hazy under the full
faith and credit clause. 73 Since important contacts and vital interests in a multistate Conflict-of-Laws contract transaction may be
determining aids to the Court in fixing not only jurisdiction 174 but
choice of law 175 as well, it seems not improbable that indirectly,
if not directly, these interests and contacts so important in choosing a proper forum for jurisdictional purposes may also have some
bearing, though how much is far from certain, under full faith and
credit restrictions. 7 Tenth, as to the effect of full faith and credit
restrictions on a forum's use of its public policy to negate parties'
autonomy, it would appear that if the state law chosen by the
parties to control their agreement has superior contacts and interests, as seen by the Court, with an essential element of the transac168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.

170 Cf., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 541
(1935). See also and compare, Homes Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (due process
case).
171 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, ibid.; and see Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n of Calif. ibid.; cf., Leflar, Conflict of Laws §§ 127, 242-244 (Student ed. 1959).
172 See 41 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 3, at n.3 (1964).
178 Cf., Leflar, Conflict of Laws §§ 52, 87-90 (Student ed. 1959). See Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 168-171 (2d ed. 1951), with special attention to p. 169 and n. 98;
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 22-24 (3d ed. 1949); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, §§ 35, 38
(1962).
174 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 170. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n of Calif., supra note 170; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd.,
348 U.S. 66 (1954).
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
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tion, this stipulated law by the parties may be upheld. 77 On the
other hand, if the Court finds that the place stipulated by the
parties has inferior contacts with or interests in an essential element of the transaction, or even contacts and interests equal to
other states', then the stipulated law may be required to give way
7
to another state's law (public policy).
In the Alaska Packer'scase, the Court proceeds to compare the
background material for its decision with that of its decision in
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper.79 The Court makes a comparison of governmental interests of the Clapper case and the case
at bar. Said the Court,
There, [Clapper case] upon an appraisal of the governmental interests of the two states, Vermont and New Hampshire, it was held that
the Compensation Act of Vermont, where the statute of employer
and employee was established [this status was in California
in the Alaska Packers case], should prevail over the conflicting
statute of New Hampshire, where the injury occurred and the suit
was brought. In reaching that conclusion, weight was given to the
following circumstances: that liability under the Vermont Act
was an incident of the status of employer and employee created
within Vermont, and as such continued in New Hampshire where
the injury occurred; that it was a substitute for a tort action
[characterizationis important here], which was permitted by the
statute of New Hampshire; that the Vermont statute expressly
provided that it should extend to injuries occurring without the
state and was interpreted to preclude recovery by proceedings
brought in any other state; and, that there was no adequate basis
for saying that the compulsory recognition of the Vermont statute
by the courts of New Hampshire would be obnoxious to the public
policy of that state.' 8

Continued the Court in regard to the Clapper case,
If, for the reasons given [immediately above], the Vermont statute
was held to override the New Hampshire statute in the courts of

New Hampshire [not obnoxious to New Hampshire laws if tried
there], it is hardly to be supposed that the Constitution would
require it to be given any less effect in Vermont, even though the
New Hampshire statute were set up as a defense to proceedings

177 Undoubtedly, had the parties chosen California law in Alaska Packers, the Court,
finding superior contacts and interests of essential elements of the transaction with California, would have sustained their choice of law. In a due process case, Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Court sustained the parties' choice of law when the connections were vital and the foreign nation had vital interests in the contract.
178 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
179 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
180 294 U.S. at 548.
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there. Similarly, in the present case, only if it appears that, in the
conflict of interests which have found expression in the conflicting
statutes, the interest of Alaska is superior to that of California,
is there rational basis for denying to the courts of California
there to apply the laws of their own state. While in Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, supra., it did not appear that the
subordination of the New Hampshire statute to that of Vermont
by compulsion of the full faith and credit clause, would be obnoxious to the policy of New Hampshire, the Supreme Court of
California has declared it to be contrary to the policy of the State
to give effect to the provisions of the Alaska statute and that they
conflict with its own statutes.' 8'
The Court looked to state contacts of the transaction also in com-

parison of the Clapper case with the Alaska Packer's case. Said the
Court:
There are only two differences material for present purposes,
between the facts of the Clapper case and those presented in this
case: the employee here is not a resident of the place in which
the employment was begun, and the employment was wholly to
be performed in the jurisdiction in which the injury arose. Whether
these differences, with a third-that the Vermont statute was intended to preclude resort to any other remedy even without the
state-are, when taken with the differences between the New
Hampshire and Alaska compensation laws, sufficient ground for
withholding or denying any effect to the California statute in
Alaska, we need not now inquire. [Note the Court's reasoning just
above and its subjective reflections.] But it is clear that they do not
lessen the interest of California in enforcing its compensation act
within the state, or give any added weight to the interest of Alaska
in having its statute enforced in California. [The Court also considers again the vital interests of California in the Alaska Packers
case. It states them in the next sentence.] We need not repeat what
-we have already said of the peculiar concern of California in
providing a remedy for those in the situation of the present
employee. Its interest is sufficient to justify its legislation and is
greater than that of Alaska, of which the employee was never a
resident and to which he may never return. Nor should the fact
that the employment was wholly to be performed in Alaska, although temporary in character, lead to any different result. It
neither diminishes the interest of California in giving a remedy
to the employee, who is a member of a class in the protection of
which the state has an especial interest [Since this employee in
Alaska Packers was a non-resident and apparently had no property
in California, it would seem that if he became destitute and could
not pay his bills, then the taxpayers of Californiahad to pay them
for him.], nor does it enlarge the interest of Alaska whose temporary relationship with the employee has been severed. [Compare
the "technical domicile" in due process considerations of Dick'8 2
181
182

Id. at 548-549.
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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with the "temporary relationship of Alaska with the employee" in
83
the Alaska Packers case.]'

Then the Court found that the interests of Alaska in the case
at bar were not shown superior to those of California; that no
persuasive rationale was shown for denying to a California forum
the right to use its own public policy in its home courts; that the
full faith and credit clause, under these circumstances, weighed
subjectively, as the Court sees the factual situation in this particular case, did not require the California statute to yield to that of
Alaska. As the Court subjectively saw both the Clappercase and the
Alaska Packers case, it was doing equity to all parties concerned.
Full faith and credit is iot automatic; it has fair, just, and equitable underpinnings upon which the decision of each case must
rest. 84

Before leaving these two cases, we must observe that characterization played important roles in each; 1 85 that convenient or inconvenient forums certainly were considered in the Alaska Packers
case in jurisdictional findings;186 and that although the Court did
not mention the role of the stipulated law in Alaska Packers, it
seems rational to surmise that the Court took the stipulated law
into consideration, but, finding that more important contacts and
interests were with California, the parties were restricted in their
choice of law accordingly.8 7 This is not out of line with our "general rule."'1s8
In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken,8 9 we find much the same
type of balancing of interests among all the parties concerned with
the transaction; there is a consideration of governmental interests
and vitality of state contacts with essential elements of the transaction. A seven-year term policy, which was issued by a life insurance
company in Connecticut and delivered to the insured in Tennessee
294 U.S. at 549-550.
See also, Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66 (1954);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
185 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 541
(1935), and the Court's reference to Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145,
157-158 (1932).
186 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 542, 543,
549-550 (1935).
187 Ibid.
188 See the "general rule" explained in the first part of this article.
189 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
183
184
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where he then resided, provided that at the sole option of the insured and upon any anniversary of its date, without medical examination, the policy would be convertible into a 20-payment-life
commercial policy, which would bear the same date, etc., on the
payment of the difference between the premiums then paid and
those to be required under the converted policy. After the insured
had become a Texas citizen and inhabitant, he exercised the option in due form, and the converted policy was sent to him in Texas.
An action was brought upon the converted policy in Texas, where
the insurance company had been doing business. The forum court
used a Texas statute to impose a 12% penalty on the insurance
company and required it to pay the claimant's attorneys fees; these
would not have been allowed under Tennessee law.
The Court considered first whether the converted policy was
a new policy or merely a continuation of the first policy. This was
purely a matter of characterization, and, as previously pointed out,
may often turn the decision. 19° The Court decided that the converted policy was but a continuation of the first policy of insurance.
Next the Court wanted to see, logically from the facts, which
state had the most important contacts with and interests in essential
elements of the transaction. Of course, this involved the Court's
subjective appraisal of a factual situation and the weighing of the
facts according to their importance. It observed that the policy
had more important contacts with Tennessee; thus, the Court held
it to be a Tennessee contract, as was the converted policy.
The Court, therefore, upon appeal from the Texas courts,
held that the use of Texas public policy violated the Constitution.
It found that a state could not regulate business outside of its
limits, and control an agreement made by citizens of other states
in disregard of their laws-the proper law to be used in such
matters was to be determined by the facts of the case. Said the
Court,
The insurance company is a Connecticut corporation. When it
issued the policy it was doing business in Texas under the laws of
190 Cf., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Homes Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., supra
note 185.
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that State, of which Dunken [the insured] then was a citizen and
inhabitant. 191

Continued the Court,
The policy in question was issued under the following circumstances: On December 17, 1910, H. B. Alexander, manager for

the insurance company in the State of Tennessee, took the application of Dunken, then a resident of Tennessee, for a seven-year term
policy. The policy was duly
92 issued in Connecticut and delivered
in Tennessee to Dunken.
Then, the Court went into the nature of convertibility of the
term policy into a 20-payment-commercial policy and under what
circumstances it was accomplished. It considered the later residence
and citizenship of the insured in Texas, and the conversion of the
policy at that time. From all of the evidence the Court found that
the contract was a Tennessee agreement, rather than Connecticut
or Texas. It held that for Texas courts to find otherwise would
violate the contract impairment clause, the full faith and credit
clause, and, apparently, the due process clause.
It is interesting to note that the Court cites as authority for its
opinion New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge9 3 and Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Liebing.194 Not only was the language of these policies in
the case at bar discussed as possible factors in the decisions, but the
relevancy of contacts and interests can be observed, I believe, by
rational inference. Are not these cases more due-process-of-law controversies 19 5 on the whole rather than full faith and credit clause
cases? May we infer, therefore, that bases of jurisdiction and bases
of full faith and credit, although the two are different, are in
many respects similar; 196 and, that the same equitable consider191 266 U.S. at 390.
192 Id. at 391.
193
194
195

246 U.S. 357 (1918).
259 U.S. 209 (1922).

Cf., Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's
Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 450, 452 (1959).
196 Cf., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954), where
the Court, looking at the contacts and interests of the respective states in the conflict-oflaws litigation, found that what it had said in regard to due process of law considerations of jurisdiction ". . . goes far toward answering the Full Faith and Credit Clause
contention." This should be compared with what was said by Mr. Justice Black in his
dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-259 (1958): "True, the question whether
the law of a State can be applied to a transaction is different from the question whether
the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the two are often closely
related and to a subsantial degree depend upon similar considerations." So, considering
Watson in its connection of Full Faith and Credit requirements with Due Process jurisdic-
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ations' 97 that lie as a least common denominator for the one may be
found in the other? May we not likewise infer that when parties to an
agreement stipulate a place law to control their agreement, they
must weigh carefully the importance of that place having contacts
with and vital interests in essential elements of their transaction?
If this is done with great care, may we not assume that the Court
will hold for the stipulated place law when the Court finds that its
connections and interests are superior to other multistate contacts
9
of the transaction.

8

In Aetna, the Court, upon finding that Tennessee law applied, did not state with any high degree of particularity the one
specific ground upon which it found that Texas public policy must
yield to a constitutional mandate. May we not assume that possibly
a reason for this was that the Court found the underpinnings 99
of the least common denominator as a unit 2°° were sufficient; that
these underpinnings were in common with due process, full faith
and credit, and the contract impairment clause?21' Remember that
the challenge to the Texas court's opinions rested upon grounds
relating to ". . . the contract impairment clause, the full faith and
credit clause, and the several clauses of Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution ..... 202
Many of the same bases of constitutional decision are presented
in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n20 3 as were
tion based on a state's having vital interests and contacts, and supplementing it with
Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Hanson that similarities exist in both jurisdiction and
choice of law, we find that Choice of Law, Due Process of Law jurisdiction, and Full
Faith and Credit requirements are all based, in the main, upon the most vital interests and
contacts of one of the states with the transaction. That they are different is admitted; but
if their differences are not defined exactly (possibly they are undefinable) and they may
be, in the main, equated with similar requirements, are we not approaching the mathematical formula that things equal to the same things are equal to each other? At least, we
should watch the Court in the future develop or fail to develop this theory. Of course,
mathematics may not always be suitable in legal theory application.
197 Cf., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of
Calif., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
198 Compare Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., ibid.
199 By "underpinnings," I mean bases.
200 By "unit" of the underpinnings of the least common denominator, I mean "fairness," as that word, more or less, sums up the "balancing of equities," "reasonable," "justice," and "non-discrimination".
201 If my "Premise of Constitutional Construction" is accurate, it would seem so.
202 266 U.S. at 393.
203 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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presented in Alaska Packers and the Dunken cases. A Massachusetts corporation employee, residing in that state and regularly employed under an agreement of employment made there, was injured
in the course of his employment while on a temporary assignment
for his employer in California. The Workmen's Compensation Act
of Massachusetts purported to provide an exclusive remedy (unless
the employee notified his employer within a certain time after an
injury of some other choice of remedy he desired to pursue, which,
in this case, he did not do), even though the injury might be suffered in another jurisdiction. The Court distinguished the Clapper
case 20 4 on the ground that the public policy of the one state in
Clapper was not obnoxious to that of the other state connected
with the transaction, while in Pacific the California and Massachusetts laws were in direct and open conflict with each other and
highly obnoxious to one another.
Again, the Court spoke in terms of its being an arbiter 2 5 in
such matters when there was a clash of states' policies; that the full
faith and credit clause was not automatic; that in essence there
must be a balancing of interests-state against state-and that here
it seemed poor national policy to make an injured employee in
California return to his state for a remedy even if California enforced Massachusetts law in its courts as the proper choice of laws.
(Could this be a reference to an inconvenient forum as a basis of
application of full faith and credit?); that California might not
have the administrative machinery necessary to perform its tasks,
and that California physicians, hospitals, and other parties necessary to the cure of the patient should not be made to wait on a
Massachusetts decision and the administration of Massachusetts
law to obtain redress for any costs entailed by the injured employee
in California. Here we see just how vital the California forum's
interests are in the case. The Court felt that in this litigation the
policies of each state-Massachusetts and California-were entitled
to be administered as that state thought best, but the contacts with
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
Compare with Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 294 U.S.
532 (1935). See also, Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
When there is conflict among states of a federation, there must be an arbiter. In our
system of government, the United States Supreme Court seems to fill that position quite
well.
204
205
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California were too important to force it automatically to give
full faith and credit to the Massachusetts statutes.
The Court looked into the human societal issues of the
equities in California which, as we have seen, underlie much of
constitutional mandate in regard to state public policies under full
faith and credit. Said Mr. Justice Stone for the Court:
The question is whether the full faith and credit which the Constitution requires to be given to a Massachusetts workmen's compensation statute precludes California from applying its own workmen's compensation act in the case of an injury suffered by a
Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts employer while in California in the course of his employment. 206 [Is not the Court balancing equities here?]

The Court, in its decision that California need not give full
faith and credit to the Massachusetts statute, found that each state
in its own courts could apply its own public policy because of the
weight of contacts and interests, but that neither had to give full
faith and credit to the statutes of the other. In other words, equity
demanded that the equation of Order versus Liberty be grounded
upon principles of fairness, reasonableness, and nondiscrimination
since the forcing of one state to give full faith and credit to the
other's statutes when contacts and interests were so well matched
in each would amount to unfair discrimination. Full faith and
credit is not automatic in a clash of states' interests; it must be
weighed in the scales of justice and equity depending upon the
peculiar factual pattern of each case. In such an event, it would
seem that a stipulation in this case for Massachusetts law to control,
might fall to an equal interest and contact of California with the
transaction. When contacts and interests are evenly divided between states in a multistate contract, the public policy of the forum
-it being one of the interested states-may or may not be overridden in the interest of the parties' stipulated intent theory by
means of the full faith and credit clause, depending on the Court's
equitable evaluation of parties' intended place law as having vital
contacts and interests with an essential element of the transaction.
Pink, Supt. of Ins. of New York v. A.A.A. Highway Express,
Inc.,20 7 again underlines the principles of full faith and credit con208 306 U.S. at 497.
207 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
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stitutional construction thus far advanced in this article. New York
was the state of incorporation of the Auto Mutual Indemnity Company, which became insolvent and subject to winding up by the
New York Superintendent of Insurance, Pink. By the laws of New
York, policyholders of a mutual insurance company became members of the company and subject to assessments as fixed by such
laws when the company was in liquidation under state proceedings.
The policies in this case were purchased by Georgia residents and
citizens. The policies did not indicate that by the purchase of the
insurance the buyers would become stockholders; there was a reference to such law on the back of the policies, but no reference to it
in the contract itself. The New York Insurance Superintendent
sought to require Georgia to give full faith and credit to judgments
in New York winding up the company. It was admitted that mailed
notices of such suits for judgments were sent to the Georgia purchasers, but they did not appear and recognize the jurisdiction of
the New York court. It was admitted by the New York authorities
in the case that these judgments were not personal against the
Georgia policyholders. The Georgia court interpreted (determined 20 or characterized) the policies and found that the reference
to the New York law on the reverse side of the contracts was not a
part of the agreement; that the policyholders apparently were
therefore not stockholders in the New York company; that therefore it did not have to give full faith and credit to the New York
law concerning a matter domestic to Georgia and involving a mere
interpretation by the Georgia court of the policies of insurance.
. The Court, upon appeal, agreed with Georgia. It found that
these policies were local (i.e., it characterized them as local) Georgia policies, (apparently delivered in Georgia) and subject to
Georgia domestic policy in interpreting whether the policyholders,
by the policies, became members of the New York company as
stockholders and were, therefore, liable for the New York insurance Superintendent's special assessments under New York statutes. The policyholders had not appeared or been personally
served in the New York suit leading to the New York judgment
in liquidation of the company. Said the Court:
208

In teaching Conflict of Laws, I have found that students have less difficulty with
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Without the command of some constitutionally controlling statute, the Georgia court was free to interpret [characterize]the obligation of the policy as limited to those stipulations expressed on
its face and as excluding any stipulation for membership or for
liability to assessment which the contract did not mention. 20 9
Continued the Court:
Every state has authority under the Constitution to establish laws,
through both its judicial and its legislative arms, which are controlling upon its inhabitants and domestic affairs. When it is
demanded in the domestic forum that the operation of those
laws be supplanted by the statute of another state, that forum is
not bound, apart from the full faith and credit clause, to yield to
by its own force, deterthe demand, and the law of neither 2can,
10
mine the choice of law for the other.
Then, the Court observed that:
To the extent that Georgia must give full faith and credit to the
New York statutes and judicial proceedings, it must be denied
authority to adjudicate the meaning and domestic effect under its
own laws of a contract entered into by its own inhabitants and
containing no stipulation that they should be bound by obligations
extrinsically imposed by New York law. 21 ' [Did the Court at
this point mean that had the parties stipulated expressly to be
bound by New York law that such a stipulation might have been
basic in the decision? Possibly, therefore, had the parties stipulated
expressly for New York law to control, it might have been permitted by the Court.]
Then, the Court continued:
It was the purpose of that provision [full faith and credit clause]
to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts
and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of
their validity in others. But the very nature of the federal union
of states, to each of which is reserved the sovereign right to make
its own laws, precludes resort to the Constitution as the means of.
compelling one state wholly to subordinate its own laws and policy
concerning its peculiarly domestic affairs to the laws and policy
of others. [Note peculiarly 'domestic affairs' characterization.]
When such conflict of interest arises, it is for this Court to resolve
it by determining how far the full faith and credit clause demands
the qualification or denial of rights asserted under the laws of
one state, that of the212forum, by the public acts and judicial proceedings of another.
the word "Determine" than they do with "Qualification," "Classification," or "Characterization." The latter words on occasions, with some students at least, seem to raise difficulties.
209 314 U.S. at 209.
210
211

Ibid.
Id. at 209-210.

212 Id. at

210.
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The Court continued with a discussion of the peculiar domestic affairs in this case with which the full faith and credit clause
was not intended to interfere. In other words, Georgia, in superior
interests and contacts, surpassed New York under this factual pattern as the Court subjectively saw the picture. The Court readily
cited Griffin v. McCoach,218 as in point. Then, the Court observed
that:
Were it not for the New York statute, there could be no question
of Georgia's authority to adjudicate the rights and obligations
arising under the policies. And as we have seen [subjective
appraisal by the Court], the only basis for the imposition by New
York of its commands on the Georgia court and policyholders is
the assumption by the latter of membership in the New York
company. But this, in the circumstances of this case, depends upon
the meaning and effect of all the provisions appearing on the
policies with respect to the assumption of membership, which is
for Georgia [to characterize] to determine.2 14
The Court then found that full faith and credit was not required
by Georgia because of the peculiar factual pattern of local or domestic interests and contacts of the agreements with Georgia which
overrode the contacts and interests of New York.
Carroll v. Lanza21 5 seems to buttress what we have said before, both in regard to constitutional construction and in regard
to the effects of full faith and credit limitations on a forum's arbitrary and discriminatory use of its public policy to negate the
parties' stipulated place law. The petitioner, Carroll, was employed by Hogan, an intervenor, who was in turn a subcontractor
performing work for Lanza, the respondent, and the general contractor. Both Hogan and Carroll were residents of Missouri. Carroll's employment agreement with Hogan was made in Missouri,
but the work under this contract was performed in Arkansas
where the injury occurred. Carroll was not aware that he had
remedies under the law of Arkansas and received some thirty-four
weeks of payments for the injury under the Missouri Compensation Act. This Act was applicable to injuries received either inside
or outside the state in case the employment agreement was made in
the state. The Act also provided that every employer and employee
213
214
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313 U.S. 498 (1941).
314 U.S. at 211.
349 U.S. 408 (1955).
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shall be "conclusively presumed to have elected to accept" its provisions unless "prior to the accident" the employee filed with the
Workmen's Compensation Commission of the state a written notice that he had "elected" to refuse this provision of the Act. 218 It
appears that no notice, as required, was filed. Also, the Act provided that the rights and remedies which should be granted by it
"shall exclude all other rights and remedies ... at common law or
otherwise," by reason of the injury or death of the employee.2 1
Also, there was an Arkansas provision for Workmen's Compensation under its Act. This Act provided for an exclusive rem-

edy of an employee against his employer, but not against any third
party. The lower court had ruled upon a review of Arkansas

authorities that a general contractor, such as the respondent,
Lanza, was a third party under the Arkansas Act.

During the period that Carroll was receiving his weekly payments under the Compensation Act of Missouri, he decided to
bring suit against Lanza for common-law damages in the courts
of Arkansas. The case was removed to the federal courts. Here a
judgment was had for Carroll. It seems that the Court of Ap-

peals, 1 s in agreeing with the lower court that the judgment was
proper under the law of Arkansas, reversed on the constitutional
ground that the full faith and credit clause prevented recovery.

There was an appeal to the United States Supreme Court upon
the doubts that existed as to the correctness of the decision under
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Comm'n. 19
The Court of Appeals had thought that Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 20 was controlling. In the Magnolia case, the employee
had received a final award for workmen's compensation in his
forum, which was also the place of injury. After this, he returned
to his home state and brought suit to recover under his home
state's workmen's compensation statutes. The Court in that case
held that the home state was precluded under the constitutional
mandate of full faith and credit from rendering an award. In the
216
217
218
219
220

Mo.
Mo.
216
306
320

Rev. Stat. 1949, § 287.060.
Rev. Stat. 1949, § 287.120
F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1954).
U.S. 493 (1939).
U.S. 430 (1943).
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Carroll case, though, there was no final award as in Magnolia. Under the Missouri Act, the payments were apparently begun automatically upon receipt of notice of the injury to the employee. Although there was a provision which provided for an adjudication
under the Missouri Act in cases similar to the one at bar, in fact no
adjudication was sought or gotten under the Missouri Act.
Said the Court:
Nor do we have a case where an employee, knowing of two remedies which purport to be mutually exclusive, chooses one as against
the other and therefore is precluded a second choice by the law
of the forum. Rather we have the naked question whether the Full
Faith and Credit Clause makes Missouri's statute a bar to Arkansas's
common-law remedy. 22'
Then the Court said:
A statute is a "public act" within the meaning of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause .... 2 2
Continued the Court:
The Pacific Employers Insurance Co. case223 allowed the Compensation Act of the place of injury to override the Compensation Act
of the home State. Here [case at bar] it is a common-law action
that is asserted against the exclusiveness of the remedy of the home
State; and that is seized on as marking a difference. That is not in
our judgment a material difference. [Observe the Court's subjective rationalizationat this point.) Whatever deprives the remedy
of the home State of its exclusive character qualifies or contravenes
the policy of that State. [Note the equating of policy and law of a
state.] and denies it full faith and credit, if full faith and credit
is due. But the Pacific Employers Ins. Co. case teaches that in these
personal injury cases the State where the injury occurs need not be
a vassal to the home State and allow only that remedy which the
home State has marked as the exclusive one. The State of the
forum also has interests to serve and to protect. Here Arkansas
has opened its courts to negligence suits against prime contractors,
refusing to make relief by way of workmen's compensation the
exclusive remedy. . . . Here interests are large and considerable
and are to be weighed not only in the light of the facts of this case
but by the kind of situation presented. Is the Court "compartmentalizing" here so that we must note the nature of the action,
its purpose, the nature of the damage done, etc., so that we have
rules separate and distinct for each case segment in a Conflictof-Laws case?] For we write not only for this case and this day
alone, but for this type of case. [Do we have to find special contacts
and interests in this type of case in order to determine the Court's
221
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222 Ibid.
228 Supra note
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decisional bases?] The State where the tort occurs [Is the Court
mixing Tort and Contract concepts in its inferred characterization
here?] certainly has a concern in the problems following in the
wake of the injury. The problems of medical care and of possible
dependents are among these, as Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Commission, supra., emphasized. [Is this not true of all types of
litigation?] . .

.

. A State that legislates concerning them is ex-

ercising traditional powers of sovereignty. [Is this not true of most
types of state legislation?] Cf., Watson v. Employers Liability
Corporation, 348 U.S. 66, 67. Arkansas therefore has a legitimate
interest in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though
in this case Carroll's
injury may have cast no burden on her or on
2 4
her institutions.

Then the Court tried to distinguish Hughes v. Fetter 25 from
the case at bar. It stated that:
This is not a case like Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, where the
State of the forum seeks to exclude from its courts actions arising
under a foreign statute. In that case, we held that Wisconsin could
not refuse to entertain a wrongful death action under an Illinois
statute for an injury occurring in Illinois, since we found no sufficient policy considerations to warrant such refusal. And see Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629. The present case is a much weaker
one for application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Arkansas,
the State of the forum, is not adopting any policy of hostility to
the public Acts of Missouri. It is choosing to apply its own rule of
law to 226
give affirmative relief for an action arising within its
borders.

Then, the Court concluded that Missouri, apparently because of its important contacts and interests, may make her compensation statutes as exclusive as she likes and do as much as she

wishes with them in her own courts. But the constitutional issue
is raised if and when Missouri attempts to extend her laws or
policy determinants into other jurisdictions which have, as subjectively viewed by the Court, as important and vital contacts and
interests as does Missouri; and, thus, the other state in its courts
may do in its courts the same as Missouri may do in its. Said the
Court:
Arkansas can adopt Missouri's policy [laws] if she likes. Or, as the
Pacific Employers Insurance Company case teaches, she may supplement it or displace it with another, insofar as remedies for acts
occurring within her bounderies are concerned. [Note the Court's
differentiation here between substantive law and adjective law by
means of characterization.]Were it otherwise, the State where the
224 349 U.s. at 412-13.
225 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
226 349 U.S. at 413.
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injury occurred would be powerless to provide any remedies [Are
we to take remedies here as characterized as procedural, or are
remedies spoken of in terms of a broader perspective?] or safe-

guards to nonresident employees working within its borders. We

do not think [subjective appraisement again by the Court.] the

Full Faith and Credit
227 Clause demands that subserviency from the
State of the injury.

There was a noteworthy Frankfurter dissent in this case.228 It
would appear that Mr. Justice Frankfurter would rely on the "Abstention Doctrine, ' 229 although he did voice his opinion on the
factual situation. The dissent was concurred in by Justices Burton
8 In spite of his views on "Abstention," Mr. Justice
and Harlan.Y
Frankfurter seemed to think that the choice of law should have
been either that of Arkansas or Louisiana rather than the law of
Missouri. He found from the facts that Hogan (the subcontractor)
was a Missouri employer and had a Missouri employment agreement with Carroll (the injured workman). Therefore, when Carroll sought compensation in Arkansas (where he was injured),
Hogan and his insurer might have relied upon the statutes of
Missouri and the Clapper2 "l case as a defense. Why they did not is
not certain. Then, Justice Frankfurter found that Lanza (the
general contractor) was not a Missouri employer; that the record
did not disclose that he had a Missouri employment contract with
either Carroll or with Hogan. He observed that the basic agreement between Hogan and Lanza was on a Louisiana letterhead
and was a contract for work apparently to be done in Arkansas exclusively. It seems that Hogan had promised to secure workmen
and, "It is further understood that ... Hogan . . .will carry the

necessary insurance on his men in according (sic) with the rules of
the state of Arkansas." (Is not this a stipulation for Arkansas law
to control the agreement, indirectly, if not 'directly?) Frankfurter
then observed that the supplemental agreement for the special
work on which Carroll was injured consisted of a letter bid by
Hogan to Lanza and a similar means of reply authorizing Hogan
to proceed. So, from the choice of law in the case, it seemed to
him that the choice should lie between the law of Louisiana or
Id. at 408, 413, 414 (1955).
Id. at 414-426.
See Note, Federal Abstention-Due Process in Conflict of Laws in the Application
of the Lex Fori, 10 Amer. U.L. Rev. 88 (1961).
230 349 U.S. at 414-426.
281 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
227
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that of Arkansas, but in no event should it be governed by Missouri law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also asked why Arkansas law should
be allowed to prevail. He stated that:
..the interest of the forum here is solely dependent on the [fortuitoUs2s2] occurrence of the injury within its borders. No rights
of Arkansas residents are involved, since none of the parties is an
Arkansan; the workman was removed immediately to a Missouri
hospital and has, so far as appears, remained in Missouri. What
might be regarded as the societal interests of Arkansas in the protection of the bodily safety of workers within its borders is an interest equally true of any jurisdiction where a workman is injured
the sort of interest which New Hampshire had in
and exactly
2
Clapper. 8

He then stated that to make the interest of Arkansas override that
of Missouri would require that Clapper be expressly overruled,
which has not been done. And, if Clapper is to be overruled, he
stated,
it should be done with reasons making manifest why Mr. Justice Brandeis' long-matured, weighty opinion in that case was illfounded. It should not be cast aside on the presupposition that
full faith and credit need not be given to a sister-state workmen's
compensation if the law of the forum happens to be more favorable to the claimant a 4 [Is this by indirection an indictment of
Douglas' reasoning?]
...

Would not Mr. Justice Frankfurter apparently be more free
in the use of full faith and credit to limit the forum's policy determinants when in conflict with those of a sister state than would
the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas?285 He stated:
the forum cannot, by statute or otherwise, refuse to enforce a
...
sister-state statute giving a transitory cause of action, whether in
contract or tort ..... [He cites numerous cases as authority.] The
forum may, however, apply its own more restrictive statute of limitations to an outside wrongful death action, Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., supra., [345 U.S. 514 (1953)] and dicta indicate that
it may refuse to enforce a penal law, a law found to be antagonistic
to the forum's public policy, or a law which requires specialized
proceedings or remedies not available in the forum, see Broderick
v. Rosner, 294 U.S., at 642-643; Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S., at
612.236
232 It would appear that Mr. Justice Frankfurter was thinking in terms of the "happen chance" or the fortuitous.
233 549 U.S. at 420-421.
284 Id. at 422.
285 Compare 349 U.S. at 414-426 with Id. at 408-414.
286

Id. at 415.
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To put it mildly, with the shifting of minorities and majorities on the Court by death or retirement, does not constitutional
mandate still remain inconstant as well as a pragmatic thing dependent upon many uncertain factors?287 Some certainty in the law
is advisable for all; 288 yet, that certainty should not be a straitjacketed uniform preventing elasticity2 89 in the application of
equitable principles. I believe, on the whole, the Court tries, in its
decisions, to use equitable principles of fairness, justice, reasonableness, and non-discrimination. If perchance, at times, it gets off
the "proverbial path" of meaningful norms and standards, it is a
human court.
It seems to me that the majority opinion in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp.,240 written by Mr. Justice Black, is
far more comprehensible than that of Carroll. This suit arose out
of an agreement made between the Employers' Liability Assurance
Corporation, a British concern, and the Toni Company, which was
a division of the Gillette Safety Razor Company, a Delaware corporation, with its principal offices in Massachusetts. The agreement contained a provision that,
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition
precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all
the terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.

Alleging injuries sustained in Louisiana where the product
was bought and used, the plaintiffs brought an action against the
insurerunder a Louisiana statute which gave an injured person a
right of direct action against the insurer before final determination
of the insurer's obligation to pay, and irrespective of whether the
contract was executed in Louisiana or whether it contained a
clause forbidding such direct action.
It appears that the agreement was issued and delivered to
Gillette in Massachusetts and a copy delivered to Toni in Illinois.
237 See "Summary and Condusion," infra, and "A Premise of Constitutional Construction," supra.
238 How are lawyers to advise clients unless there is a great deal of certainty in law?
.289 Principles of equity and justice demand some elasticity. certainly, no one would
contend that statutes, often drawn by inarticulate legislators, may be, on all occasions and
under all circumstances, interpreted with a mathematical exactitude.
240 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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At the beginning, therefore, we have a possible choice of law from
Massachusetts or from Illinois to control incidents flowing from
the agreement since there are at least some connections of the
agreement with these states, and each state had possible interests
in the contract. It appears that both of these states recognize the
right of an insurance company to protect its finances by making
its indirect accountability to a third party contingent on a judgment against the insured or some type of compromise settlement
which would be participated in by the insurer. But to subject the
insurance company to a suit by a third person claimant directly
against the company before a judgment against the insured would
appear to subject the company to an obligation for which it had
not contracted and which it expressly refused to assume. Thus, in
sanctioning protection of the insurance funds by the "no-action"
clause, it appears that both Illinois and Massachusetts had expressed their state policies, which would seem to be of the same
constitutional perspective as Louisiana asserted in its own legislation which permitted direct actions. It may be observed that Massachusetts is deeply concerned with the financial well-being of the
insurance companies whose activities center within its borders; this
is of considerable interest to Massachusetts citizens. Also, both
Illinois and Massachusetts share some concern for the interest of
the insured in the nature and scope of the obligations which may
bind as well as protect him. Also, the premiums paid by the insured under this policy varied somewhat directly with the losses
which were paid by the insurer; to that extent, at least, the insured had an interest in the "no-action" clause.
Under the 'Louisiana code parties injured were allowed to
bring direct actions against a liability insurance company which
had issued a policy agreeing to pay liabilities which were imposed
on parties who inflicted harm on others. The suit here involved
this type of action. Mr. and Mrs. Watson in a state court of
Louisiana claimed damages against the appellee, the Employers'
Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, because of certain alleged personal injuries suffered by Mrs. Watson. The suit charged
that the injuries took place in Louisiana when Mrs. Watson
bought and used in iLouisiana a "Toni Home Permanent," a hairwaving concoction, which she alleged had within it highly dan-
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gerous latent ingredients placed there by its manufacturer. The
producer of this product was the Toni Company of Illinois, which
was a subsidiary of the Gillette Safety Razor Company.
Mr. Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court. He stated
that:
The particular problem presented with reference to enforcing the
Louisiana statute in this case arises because the insurance policy
sued on was negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and delivered
in Massachusetts and Illinois. This Massachusetts-negotiated contract contains a clause, recognized as binding and enforceable under Massachusetts and Illinois law, which prohibits direct actions
against the insurance company until after final determination of

the Toni Company's obligation to pay personal injury damages
either by judgment or agreement. Contrary to this contractual "noaction" clause, the challenged statutory provisions [Louisiana's]

permit injured persons to sue an insurance company before such
final determination.2 41

Continued the Court:
The basic issue raised by the attack on both of these provisions
[Louisiana Insurance Code provisions allowing action on the insurrance company directly] is whether the Federal Constitution forbids Louisiana to apply its own 242
law and compels it to apply the
law of Massachusetts or Illinois.

The insurance company had had to comply with the Louisiana
statutes which compelled such companies, in order to get certificates to do business in that state, to consent to such direct action
suits. The insurance company moved in the federal court (where

the case was removed on grounds of diversity) to dismiss,
...contending that the two Louisiana statutory provisions contravened the Equal Protection, Contract, Due Process
and Full
Faith and Credit clauses of the Federal Constitution. 243
The Court dismissed the constitutional contentions based
upon the Contract and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution as without merit.2 44 The Court then considered the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit contentions of the allegations. It
stated that:
Had the policy sued on been issued in Louisiana there would be
no arguable due process question ..... But because the policy was
Id. at 67-68.
242 Id. at 69.
243 Ibid.
244 Id. at 70.
241
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bought, issued and delivered outside of Louisiana, Employers invokes the due process principle that a state is without power to exercise 'extraterritorial jurisdiction,' that is to regulate and control
activities wholly beyond its boundaries. Such a principle was recognized and applied in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, a case
strongly relied on by Employers. [The Court here discussed the
Dick245 case] .... Thus, [in reference to Dick] the subject matter
of the contract related in no manner to anything that had been
done or was to be done in Texas [in the Dick case]. For this reason, Texas [in the Dick case] was denied power to alter the obligation of the Mexican contract. But this Court carefully pointed
out that its decision might have been different had the activities
relating to the contract taken place in Texas [in Dick] upon 246
which
the State could properly lay hold as a basis for regulations.
The Court reemphasized what it meant by significant contacts
and interests in contradistinction to those agreements choosing
states which did not have such contacts and having little or no
interest in the transaction. Said the Court:
Some contracts made locally, affecting nothing but local affairs,
may well justify a denial to other states of power to alter those contracts. But, as this case illustrates, a vast part of the business affairs
of this Nation does not present such simple local situations. Although this insurance contract was issued in Massachusetts, it was
to protect Gillette and its Illinois subsidiary against damages on
account of personal injuries that might be suffered by users of
Toni Home Permanents anywhere in the United States, its territories, or in Canada. As a consequence of the modem practice of
conducting widespread business activties throughout the entire
United States, this Court has in a series of cases held that more
states than one may seize hold of local activities which are part
of multistate transactions and may regulate to protect interests of
its own people, even though other phases of the same
transaction
might justify regulatory legislation in other states.247
The Court next looked to see what contacts and vital interests
Louisiana might have in the transaction. It found that:
Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be
Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care
for them. Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana
homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call upon friends, relatives, or
the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interest
in the injured by providing remedies for recovery of damages. It
has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are designed
to assure ultimate payment of such damages. Moreover, Louisiana
courts in most instances provide the most convenient forum for
245 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
246 348 U.S. at 70-71.
247 Id. at 71-72.
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trial of these cases. [Are we to assume that the convenient or inconvenient forum may be considered as a factor in jurisdictional
bases of due process and also, possibly, a factor in arriving at
whether a state should be forced to give full faith and credit to the
laws of another state?] But modem transportation and business
methods have made it more difficult to serve
2 48 process on wrongdoers who live or do business in other states.

The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that due process
jurisdiction existed in Louisiana to try the case. Its contacts and
interests were sufficient for it to take jurisdiction. Then the Court
seems to say that the bases for due process jurisdiction are, on the
whole, similar to the bases for applying full faith and credit constitutional requirements to states' clashes of policy determinants.
It stated: "What we have said above goes far toward answering the
Full Faith and Credit Clause contention. ' 249 Then the Court observed that the full faith and credit clause was not an automatic
springboard by means of which states were compelled without

reason, fairness, justice, and equity to give credit to policies of
other states in a multistate factual transaction and thus be denied

the use of their own policies in their own forum courts. Said the
Court,
Where, as here, a contract affects the people of several states, each
may have interests that leave it free to enforce its own contract
policies. . . .We have already pointed to the vital interests of
Louisiana in liability insurance that covers injuries to people in
that State. Of course Massachusetts also has some interest in the
policy sued on in this case. The insurance contract was formally
executed in that State and Gillette has an office there. But plainly
these interests cannot outweigh the interest of Louisiana in taking
care of those injured in Louisiana. Since this is true, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not compel Louisiana to subordinate its direct action provisions to Massachusetts contract rules.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 503. But
cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178; Hughes
v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609.250
To reemphasize, the Court seemed to define the factors that

make for Louisiana having due process jurisdiction as similar, in
most respects, to those required for Louisiana not being compelled
to give full faith and credit to the laws of Massachusetts. The
Court balanced the interests and contacts of the two states with
248 Id. at 72.
249 Id. at 73.
250 Ibid.
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essential elements of the transaction and found that Massachusetts
had not proved its laws had superior contacts with and interests in
essential elements of the contract than those of Louisiana. Thus,
the Court, in effect, distinguished this case from the principles
underlying due process considerations in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick.25'
Before we turn to Fraternal Benefit Societies, let us review
briefly the case of Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,252 decided by the
Supreme Court in May 1964. The plaintiff was a resident of Illinois at the time he purchased a personal property insurance policy
from defendant company. The policy contained a twelve-monthsuit clause. The defendant was licensed to do business in Florida
and Illinois. Several months after the purchase of the policy, the
plaintiff became a resident of Florida, and the loss under the policy
occurred there two years later. A Florida statute nullified contract
clauses which required suits to be filed within five years or less.
A suit to recover damages under the policy was brought in
Federal District Court, Southern District of Florida, under diversity of citizenship, and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff.
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision.253 On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment,
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, and deferred the constitutional question until the Florida Supreme Court, through its
certificate procedure, could construe the Florida statute and resolve another local law question.154 The Florida Supreme Court
answered the questions in plaintiff's favor,255 but the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the application of the Florida statute
violated due process of law, and entered judgment for the defendant company.2 56 Certiorari followed to the Supreme Court, which
unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the application of the Florida statute did not violate either the due
process of law or full faith and credit clauses. The basis of the decision seemed to be that the State of Florida, the forum, had sufficient
contacts with the transaction for it to use is own public policy
rather than that of Illinois.
251
252
253
254
255
256

281
377
265
363
133
319

U.S. 397 (1930).
U.S. 179, 84 Sup. Ct. 1197 (1964).
F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
U.S. 207 (1960).
So. 2d 735 (1961).
F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963).
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The Clay case adds further proof of my "Premise of Constitutional Construction"; it also indicates that the Court, in balancing
the equation of "Order versus Liberty" in a federal union, will not
require a forum to subordinate its policy determinants to the
policies of other states having vital interests in and contacts with
essential elements of the transaction when the forum also has vital
contacts with and interests in essential elements of the agreement.
Said Mr. Justice Douglas for the Court:
The Court of Appeals relied in the main on Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., . . . and Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick.... Those were cases where the activities in the
State of the forum were thought to be too slight and too casual,
as in the Delta & Pine Land Co. case . . . , to make the application
of local law consistent with due process, or wholly lacking, as in the
Dick case. No deficiency of that order is present here. 257

Fraternal Benefit Societies ,258 because of their nature, seem at
present to require a possible exception to the reasoning of the
Court expressed in cases so far discussed. Yet, it is doubtful that a
true exception exists. The goal of all law should be the carrying
out of the wishes and desires of society in time and space. The
Court, possibly, believes that the goals of society today are more
rationally met if we construe fairness, reasonableness, justice, and
equity in a different perspective when we deal with these fraternal
benefit associations than in other cases set forth above.2 59 Even
equitable principles may be pragmatic in definition as the needs of
2
politically organized society may change in time and space.

11

Of

the several cases in this area, I shall discuss Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 261 as representative of the
group.
Mr. Justice Burton wrote the majority opinion for the Court.
He found that this action began in the courts of the state of South
84 Sup. Ct. at 1198-99.
See Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). See and compare, Stumberg, Principles
of Conflict of Laws 66 (2d ed. 1951).
259 I have discussed only one fraternal benefit society case, Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, as representative of this type of case. All of the other
cases in this article are different; at least the Court seems to think so.
260 It would seem that "fairness," "justice," "reasonableness," "non-discrimination"
might vary with the mores of the people in time and space. This is not to deny that there
may be an "absolute," "justice," et cetera. It is to state that people, being humans, are
not able to determine when their concepts of "fairness," "justice," et cetera, match the
"absolute," because they do not comprehend the "absolute."
261 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
257
258
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Dakota, brought by a citizen of Ohio against a fraternal benefit
society, incorporated in Ohio, in order to recover certain benefits
claimed to have arisen by virtue of the constitution and by-laws of
the society as a result of the death of an insured member who had
been a citizen of South Dakota during his society membership.
The issue presented was whether the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution required the South Dakota forum to give effect
to a provision of the society's constitution which prohibited the
bringing of an action in such matters more than six months after
the disallowance of the claim by certain officials of the society when
that provision was valid in Ohio, where the corporation was chartered, but when the time usually prescribed by the South Dakota
statute for beginning the suit of a similar nature was six years; also,
when another statute of the forum declared that:
Every stipulation or condition in a contract, by which any party
thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract
by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which
limits2 the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is
void. 6

Several points were brought up by the Court. First, South
Dakota allowed its own citizens to subscribe to such membership
in the foreign society; therefore, it could not be hostile to this type
of society. In other words, by inference, South Dakota's public
policy was not hostile to society memberships of South Dakotans.
Second, the very nature of this society required that there be utmost uniformity in rights and liabilities of its membership
throughout the Union. This could be better attained by using a
uniform law to control such rights and liabilities of membersnamely, the law of the state of incorporation; in this case, that law
would be the policies of the state of Ohio. Third, the society being
organized under the laws of Ohio and its by-laws and constitution
partaking of the nature of Ohio laws themselves; if Ohio laws were
given full faith and credit so would the laws of the society. Fourth,
the Court looked at the agreement to see what contacts it had with
the two states. Said the Court:
The principal office of this society has been continuously in Columbus, Ohio. The Society has established subordinate councils in
many states and, at all times involved in this case, has been li262 S. Dak. Rev. Code

§ 897 (1919).
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censed to do business in South Dakota as a foreign fraternal benefit society. [The Court is as much as saying-how can South Dakota
public policy be so outraged at this type of agreement when it permits the society a license to do business in that state?]2 68
Then, the Court continued its discussion of contacts and interests
of the states of Ohio and South Dakota with this agreement. Said
the Court:
The decedent, on July 31, 1920, applied for membership in the society through Rapid City Council No. 516, in Rapid City, South
Dakota. He was 37 years old, a man in good physical condition
and employed in an occupation of precisely the type contemplated
for membership in this society. He named his wife [apparently also
of South Dakota] as his beneficiary in case of his death from accidental means. On August 19, 1920, he was accepted by the Supreme
Council as an insured member of the society under "Class A." The
certificate number 169655, evidencing this acceptance was executed
at Columbus, Ohio, by the Supreme Counselor and Supreme Secretary. In 1922, following a brief suspension, he applied for reinstatement in what was then Black Hills Council No. 516 in Rapid
City, South Dakota, and, on December 21, 1922, was reinstated
as an insured member of the society under "Class A." In his application for this renewal, he referred to himself as a traveling
salesman, selling meat to dealers, and named his mother,26Elizabeth
4
Shane of Mt. Vernon, South Dakota, as his beneficiary.
It appeared that this renewal of membership was also executed in
Ohio. It, therefore, appeared that the contract was made, and possibly many acts connected with the agreement were to be performed, in Ohio. Fifth, the Court then characterized or determined
that the society was a fraternal benefit society, and it characterized
this type of society as requiring by its very nature more uniformity
in its rules as to obligations and rights of its membership than the
ordinary insurance contract. This could be the better advanced by
controlling the agreement by the laws of the place of incorporation
than by making rights and obligations uncertain by applying the
different laws of the various states separately and unequally to
members. Thus, the Court required that South Dakota give full
faith and credit to the laws of Ohio controlling the society which
were, by its organization under those laws, incorporated within the
society's constitution and by-laws. Ohio's connection with the
society was somewhat like a status rather than a contract so that the
268 331 U.S. at 592-593.
264 Id. at 594-595.
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laws of the domicile of the society should control the status of its
membership.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In order for a forum to use its public policy in a Conflict-ofLaws contract, it must have jurisdiction. (We assume the forum's
public policy is broad enough to encompass Conflict-of-Laws
issues.) A forum must have vital interests and contacts with an
essential element of the contract in order to obtain due-process-oflaw jurisdiction. The Court acts here as an arbiter; it has to evaluate subjectively the importance of contacts and interests the forum
may have with the transaction in making its decision.
In making this evaluation, the Court unquestionably uses
principles of constitutional interpretation (or construction).
Neither due process of law nor full faith and credit are automatic;
they are abstract legal concepts. My research has led me to deduce
that the Court may be using equitable principles of fairness,
justice, non-discrimination, and reasonableness as elements of what
I call a least common denominator in constitutional evaluation.
True enough, the Court uses these principles as it subjectively
sees them in application to the particular facts before it in each
case. Possibly, the Court evaluates factual patterns pragmatically
to meet the needs and desires of the people in time and space. After
all, is not law a tool of politically organized society to carry out its
needs and wants in time and space?
Once jurisdiction is obtained and there is a conflict of states'
policy statutes in a multistate contractual matter, the Court must
evaluate which set of facts meets the test of fairness and equity in
arriving at a solution of which state's public policy must give way
to the application of the other's public policy. Again, much as it
does in finding due-process-of-law jurisdictional bases in the first
instance, the Court now similarly finds which state has more equity
in contacts and interests for its policy to be applied than another.
Judgments of sister states are "usually" given full faith and credit
in other states. Subjectively, the Court arrives at its decision. That
there may be five to four decisions in either due process jurisdiction or under full faith and credit is not astounding. At times, any
number of men viewing the same accident,,will arrive at different
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conclusions. We must remember that the Justices, although legal
scholars, are after all but men and subject to the fallacies of all
men. It seems strange, indeed, how they manage to do so well with
the complexities of modern life and in trying to deal with them
under such abstruse legal concepts as due process of law and full
faith and credit.
If one state's contacts and interests are superior to that of
another in jurisdictional issues or in full faith and credit, there is
little trouble for the Court in rendering a decision. The difficult
issues are found in cases having factual patterns that would indicate the equities of the several states are about evenly balanced in
contacts and interests. To make the forum, under such circumstances, automatically give full faith and credit to the other state's
policies would be to deny the forum an equity; a forum's laws
should have first consideration in its own courts unless the burden
of proof is borne by the one who objects. To require a forum,
under such circumstances, to give full faith and credit to the
policies of the other state would, in logic, mean that the forum's
policies would have more strength away from its own courts than at
home. This is neither logical nor equitable. In such a case, the
Court may allow each state to use its policies in its courts. This is
no more than a balancing of equities. Similar principles are as true
in regard to attaining jurisdictional due process in the first instance as in full faith and credit considerations after jurisdiction is
attained.
In arriving at its decision to use its own policies, a forum may
not be permitted by the Court to characterize a question before it
arbitrarily, unreasonably, discriminatorily, or unfairly. Again, in
order to arrive at a decision, it would seem the Court may apply
constitutional limitations (much as above) in an equitable manner
to balance out the "metes and bounds" of fairness under the particular factual pattern. Certainly here, no less than under due
process jurisdiction and full faith and credit, the Constitution
when equitably evaluated will meet the issue. There are limits, by
virtue of the Constitution, as to how a forum may use its public
policy in obtaining its desires in any Conflict-of-Laws contract.
What part a convenient forum or an inconvenient forum
"plays" in either jurisdictional due process of law or full faith and
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credit, we are unable to say with any high degree of certainty. That
the Court sees the issue, there is little doubt. Perhaps, it is one of
the many factors that seems to the Court, subjectively, to sway the
scales of equity one way or the other.
That leaves us with the effects of the public policy of the
forum on the validity of a Conflict-of-Laws contract's specification
of an intended place law to govern. What part does the Constitution "play" here? In reading the above summary analysis, one must
consider it as not divorced from the intended place law of the
parties to a contract. Much of what we have said equally applies to
any choice of law including an intended place law of parties designation. It would seem that if the parties have evaluated past decisions of the Court and have analyzed factual patterns of the past
in those decisions, they may be able to choose their own place law
to govern their transactions so long as it is a place law that has, as
seen by the Court, the most substantial connection with an essential element of the contract and the chosen state law has the most
vital interests in the transaction. In arriving at interpretations of
Court decisions, the parties ought to be ever mindful that vacancies
do occur on the High Bench; that new men may have different
opinions from those who may have passed. It, therefore, seems
logical that the parties (or their attorneys) should keep abreast of
the background of the lives of the Justices on the Bench to discern
any environmental conditions or saturated beliefs that may have
some bearing on a decision.

